복숭아상자

Chua Beng-Huat. “Culture, Multiracialism, and National Identity in Singapore.” In Trajectories: Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, edited by Kuan-Hsing Chen, 186–205. Culture and Communication in Asia. London: Routledge, 1998.

The enforced separation of the population into bounded and homogenized races under official multiracialism has one immediate political effect. It enables the state to institute formal ‘equality’ between ‘races’. Through formal racial equality, the state is then able to see itself ideologically as an equal and disinterested protector of the rights of each group, within the boundaries of ‘national’ interests. The state, therefore, claims for itself a ‘neutral’ space above all racialized groups, without prejudice or preference. (191)

Taking the addicted population as a whole, drug addiction is overwhelmingly a problem among lesser-educated and lower-income individuals. That there is a higher representation of Malays is quite likely a result of the fact that Malays are over-represented in the lesser-educated population. A national conception of the problem and possible solutions should therefore be focused on issues of unequal distribution of incomes, instead of reducing it to a problem of the Malay race. (192)

Finally, the racialized cultural discourse displaces much of the substantive everyday life experience shared by Singaporeans as a consequence of being part of a disciplined workforce subject to the logic of globalized capitalism. (193)

Multiracialism and its attendant multiculturalism as national policy enable the state to place itself in a ‘neutral’ position above the discursively constituted ‘races’ and their respective cultures and derives for itself a high degree of relative autonomy in its exercise of power, while simultaneously insulating itself from claims of entitlement of the people as both racialized collectives and individual citizens. (193)

Multiracialism which enforces racial bonds only makes the absence of a national culture more apparent. National culture and identity must therefore be built on other grounds.

[in a Prime Minister’s statement] the trope of ‘Asian’ as a re-presentation of ‘traditions’ and ‘traditional values’ and, ideologically more significantly, as the Other of the corrosive West was already at hand. There were, however, serious doubts in different circles concerning the substance and the authenticity of so-called ‘Asian values’ and their place in a modern capitalist nation.

The Chinese language press was, however, in no doubt about what counted as Asian values: ‘diligence, not attaching too great an importance to personal gains or loss, to be filial to one’s parents and respectful to one’s elders, to be thrifty… and be prepared to repay society… to be sympathetic to others’ misfortune and sufferings and ready to give help’. Conversely, the press spelt out the so-called ‘decadent’ Western values that were to be avoided: ‘individualism, hedonism and generally self-centred “antisocial” habits which undermined the Asian work ethic and group solidarity, thereby threatening the social fabric of the Asian society’ (Koh, 1981: 294)[1] (195)

The attempt to entrench an elaborate Confucian philosophy in the ideological landscape of Singapore had failed and been abandoned but its spirit was resurrected and re-adorned in a different guise, within the government’s persistent perception of the presence of a ‘moral crisis’ due to Westernization. (197)

Its thesis is that a nation’s economic competitiveness is affected by whether its people are relatively more ‘individualistic’ or ‘communitarian’ (Goh, 1988)[2] (197)

This privileging is represented by the government as the distilled ‘essence’ of the ‘communitarian cultures of Asia’. Its enshrinement as the ‘national ethics’ presents Singapore as an ‘Asian’ nation with a ‘national’ culture that values consensus and communitarianism. (198)

‘Asianization’ thus reinforces the Singapore state’s claim to administrative ‘neutrality’; the authority of the state is thus fortified by Asianization. Such is the current turn in the ideological formation of the Singapore state, which must be seen as a temporary closure rather than the end-point in the framing of a ‘national’ identity. (198)

In this realm, the idea of ‘Asianness’ seldom feature in mundane lives of individuals. Furthermore, their activities often constitute ways of escaping the ideological formulations of the state. (199)

To above instance, among others, exemplify that daily life is, without conscious organization, seeping constantly out of the monolithic ideological and managerial structure of the Singapore state. None of the activities refer to the ‘Asian’ identity which the government is attempting to inscribe on the social body. (201)

Parreñas, Rhacel Salazar, and Lok C. D. Siu, eds. Asian Diasporas: New Formations, New Conceptions. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2007.

Introduction: Asian Diasporas- New Conceptions, New Frameworks (1-27)

By Parreñas, Rhacel Salazar, and Lok C. D. Siu

We define diaspora as an ongoing and contested process of subject formation embedded in a set of cultural and social relations that are sustained simultaneously with the “homeland” (real or imagined), place of residence, and compatriots or coethnics dispersed elsewhere. More precisely, we view the experience of diaspora as entailing (1) displacement from the homeland under the nexus of an unequal global political and economic system (2) the simultaneous experience of alienation and the maintenance of affiliation to both the country of residence and the homeland; and finally (3) the sense of collective consciousness and connectivity with other people displace from the homeland across the diasporic terrain. (1-2)

è Why always diaspora is experienced as the form of collectivity? Why not diasporic individuals but diaspora community? Are they collective features in nature?

è Keyword: alienation, displacement, homeland

As a theoretical tool, Asian diasporas should be treated as and open and flexible framework that is inductively formulated and, therefore, always being produced and revised with new research findings. (2)

We are not proposing a panethnic Asian diaspora but rather insist on referring to Asian diasporas in the plural. […] Hence, diasporic connections do not universally include the entire globe but instead are composed of fragmented, multiple connections that emerge from historically specific conditions. (7)

The Active role of Asian states in producing and sustaining diasporic connections and identifications with their respective homelands is perhaps the single most important factor that distinguishes Asian diasporas from most other diasporas (Israel being a notable exception). (8)

è Really? In that case, how can we see the first world’s diaspora? For example the USA’s broadcasting abroad towards their people, mostly soldiers. What about other country’s diasporic community? Is it true only in Asia?

è If this statement is true, but still there exists hierarchy. For example, Korean society needs to call for Korean American or Korean Japanese but Korean Chinese or Korean Russian are ignored.

While there is no singular or uncontested version of what Asia represents, the dominant perception of Asia still evokes a set of orientalized images and concerns.(9)

Aino Rinhaug (2011) Adopted: Crossing (out) Boundaries of Adoptee Kinship and Global Belonging

: 191-204

In light of how inter-country adoption has become something of a modern, global phenomenon, this study will look at how the film Adopted raises questions related to the complex issues involved in the process of transporting children across geographical, cultural, national, linguistic, and political boundaries and in creating new families and bonds of kinship based on a paradigm of alternative genealogy. (192)